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Summary
Cooperation is ubiquitous in nature, but explaining its exis-
tence remains a central interdisciplinary challenge [1–3].
Cooperation is most difficult to explain in the Prisoner’s
Dilemma game, where cooperators always lose in direct
competition with defectors despite increasing mean fitness
[1, 4, 5]. Here we demonstrate how spatial population
expansion, a widespread natural phenomenon [6–11], pro-
motes the evolution of cooperation. We engineer an exper-
imental Prisoner’s Dilemma game in the budding yeast
Saccharomyces cerevisiae to show that, despite losing to
defectors in nonexpanding conditions, cooperators in-
crease in frequency in spatially expanding populations. Flu-
orescently labeled colonies show genetic demixing [8] of
cooperators and defectors, followed by increase in cooper-
ator frequency as cooperator sectors overtake neighboring
defector sectors. Together with lattice-based spatial simula-
tions, our results suggest that spatial population expansion
drives the evolution of cooperation by (1) increasing posi-
tive genetic assortment at population frontiers and (2)
selecting for phenotypes maximizing local deme productiv-
ity. Spatial expansion thus creates a selective force
whereby cooperator-enriched demes overtake neighboring
defector-enriched demes in a ‘‘survival of the fastest.’’ We
conclude that colony growth alone can promote coopera-
tion and prevent defection in microbes. Our results extend
to other species with spatially restricted dispersal undergo-
ing range expansion, including pathogens, invasive spe-
cies, and humans.
Results and Discussion
Cooperation forms the basis for numerous complex pheno-
types, from cell-cell communication and biofilm formation in
microbes to nest construction in multicellular species [12,
13]. Explaining how cooperation evolves despite the direct
fitness advantage gained by ‘‘free riding’’ remains a central
challenge in biology and the social sciences [1–3]. This is
particularly true in the Prisoner’s Dilemma game [1, 4, 5], where
cooperators always lose in direct competition with defectors,
leading to a ‘‘tragedy of the commons’’ [14]. Nearly half a cen-
tury of research on social evolution has offered insight into this
dilemma, with inclusive fitness theory focusing attention on
the importance of high genetic relatedness [15], multilevel*Correspondence: vandyken@fas.harvard.eduselection theory highlighting the role played by competition
among social groups [16, 17], and spatial games showing the
importance of population structure [18–21]. Here we bring
these three frameworks together, demonstrating that spatial
population expansion creates a setting where both related-
ness and intergroup competition are amplified, promoting
the evolution of cooperation.
Spatial population expansion occurs when a species
spreads outward to fill vacant ecospace or to supplant resi-
dent species, resulting in increased geographic range. Human
migration out of Africa [7] is one salient example; more generic
examples include ecological invasions, epidemics, growth of
microbial colonies, and expansion due to habitat modification
caused by environmental disturbance or climate change
[8–11]. Spatially expanding populations form a propagating
density wave called a ‘‘Fisher wave’’ with a constant speed
proportional to the square root of the mean growth rate (i.e.,
Malthusian fitness) of subpopulations at the front [22]. Genet-
ically heterogeneous populations may also form an ‘‘allele fre-
quency’’ wave representing the spatial spread of alleles [22]
(see Figure S1 available online).
A small number of colonists initiate new subpopulations at
the leading edge of the propagating Fisher wave, creating a
repeated series of genetic bottlenecks or ‘‘founder effects’’
that cause stochastic loss of genetic diversity at frontiers
[23, 24]. Because cooperation is favored under conditions of
high genetic relatedness [15], range expansions could thus
in principle favor the evolution of cooperation. However, there
are at least three complicating factors. First, within-subpopu-
lation selection favoring defection opposes genetic demixing,
potentially preventing high cooperator relatedness from ever
arising. Second, even with high relatedness it is not clear
what selective force, if any, favors cooperation over defection
in expanding populations. Finally, almost any genotype that
stochastically fixes at the front can increase in frequency via
‘‘surfing’’ [6, 10, 24, 25]. Other genotypes that stochastically
fall behind this front cannot typically catch up, even if they
are more fit. This is because they expand outward in a trailing
allele frequency wave traveling at a speed determined by the
difference in fitness between defector and cooperator geno-
types, WD 2 WC, which will often be much smaller than mean
absolute fitness. For social traits, a genotype fixed at the fron-
tier will outrun genotypes in the population interior and in-
crease in global frequency provided that (1 + b)/2 > c, where
b is the social effect and c the direct fitness effect of the lead-
ing genotype (see section ‘‘Heuristic Description of Model and
Derivation of Analytical Results’’ in Supplemental Information).
The social effect here refers to the fitness increment or decre-
ment received by an individual from social partners (e.g., the
benefit of the public good), whereas the direct effect is the
fitness increment or decrement accrued to an individual for
engaging in a social behavior (e.g., the cost of producing the
public good). Note that this condition (1 + b)/2 > c can be satis-
fied evenwhen b < 0, and thus in principle surfingmay promote
cooperation’s opposites, selfishness and spite [26], including
spite against relatives. Given these complications, it is not
clear whether spatial expansion will in fact promote the evolu-
tion of cooperation.
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Figure 1. An Experimental Prisoner’s Dilemma
Populations composed of all cooperators (red) have a higher growth rate
than pure defector populations (green) (A), but cooperators lose to defec-
tors within mixed populations (B). Growth rate in (A) was assayed on agar
plates by measuring colony radius over time, which is directly proportional
to rate of cell division in S. cerevisiae [8]. Lines in (B) represent cooperator
frequency trajectories, measured by fluorescence-activated cell sorting
(FACS), in shaken liquid culture over the course of one week for four
different levels of imposed cost (50, 75, 100, and 150 nM cycloheximide con-
centrations, from top to bottom and blue to red). Error bars represent 95%
confidence intervals.
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920To test the effect of spatial expansion on defector/cooper-
ator dynamics, we engineered an experimental Prisoner’s
Dilemma game using cooperative sucrose metabolism in
haploid, vegetatively growing strains of the budding yeast
Saccharomyces cerevisiae [27]. Yeast secrete the exoenzyme
invertase in order to digest the disaccharide sucrose, which
cannot easily be imported into the cell, forming monosaccha-
rides that are readily imported. In our strains, sucrose cannot
be imported at all due to disruption of the genes MAL12 and
MAL22 [28]. Because digestion occurs externally, invertase
producers (‘‘cooperators’’) create a public good that is exploit-
able by nonproducers (‘‘defectors’’), who gain a relative fitness
advantage by not paying the fitness cost of production [27, 29].
We engineered a fluorescently marked defector strain by de-
leting the invertase gene SUC2.
We note that in minimal sucrose medium (YNB + 2% su-
crose), competitions between Suc2+ and Suc22 strains in
shaken liquid culturewere previously found to followSnowdrift
game dynamics [29]. In a Snowdrift game, the rarer type
(regardless of whether it is a cooperator or a cheater) has a
fitness advantage, leading to stable maintenance of both co-
operators and defectors [1, 30]. The maintenance of coopera-
tion is therefore easily ensured, in contrast to the Prisoner’s
Dilemma game, where the maintenance of cooperation is
much more difficult to explain [1, 30]. In addition, cooperators
in a Snowdrift game have a colonization advantage over defec-
tors because defectors cannot colonize habitat unoccupied by
cooperators [28]. This conflates colonization ability and coop-
eration by linking both to a single genotype. Because spatial
expansion is already known to select for colonization ability[31, 32], such linkage would prevent us from concluding that
spatial expansion favors cooperation per se rather than supe-
rior colonization ability. By contrast, defectors in a Prisoner’s
Dilemma game do not require the presence of cooperators
to colonize new habitat, making it possible to disentangle se-
lection for cooperation from colonization ability.
We therefore used two approaches to construct a Prisoner’s
Dilemma from this system. First, we eliminated the rare advan-
tage of cooperators that is necessary for Snowdrift dynamics
by conducting competitions in medium (YEP + 2% sucrose)
in which our defector strains could grow in the absence of co-
operators (most likely by consuming amino acids available in
YEP, although growth is slower than for cooperators; Fig-
ure 1A). This environment also eliminates the difference in
colonization ability between cooperator and cheater strains,
in that cheaters no longer require the presence of cooperators
to colonize the frontier (green line in Figure 1A). Next, we engi-
neered a defector strain resistant to cycloheximide, a transla-
tion-inhibiting drug that limits growth by binding to ribosomal
subunit Cyh2. This creates a system in which we can experi-
mentally impose a tunable ‘‘cost of cooperation’’ by varying
the level of cycloheximide in the growth medium. Specifically,
increasing the cycloheximide concentration slows the growth
of cooperators but not the resistant defectors, leading to an
increased ‘‘cost of cooperation.’’
Whenmixedwith our defector strain in an unstructured envi-
ronment (shaken liquid culture), our cooperator strain declines
at all frequencies when a cost of cooperation is imposed,
despite having a superior growth rate over defectors in pure
culture (Figures 1 and S3). These results are consistent with
Prisoner’s Dilemma evolutionary dynamics. Unlike in a Snow-
drift game, any increase in frequency of cooperators in our ex-
periments is not due to rare cooperator advantage.
To determine whether spatial expansion can promote coop-
eration in our experimental Prisoner’s Dilemma, we initiated
spatial expansions by spotting a droplet of mixed cooper-
ator/defector cultures onto solid medium (YEP + 2% sucrose +
2% agar) for a range of imposed costs (see Supplemental
Experimental Procedures). Spatial diffusion of cells in
S. cerevisiae is caused when cellular growth generates an out-
ward force leading to radial spatial expansions of colonies [8].
Note that expansion is not caused by active cell motility in this
system, as yeast lack motility. Relative frequency measure-
ments taken using flow cytometry show that cooperators
initially decline in frequency at a rate consistent with that of
well-mixed liquid competitions but then increase in frequency
as expansion proceeds (Figure 2C). Likewise, image analysis
of fluorescently labeled colonies shows low cooperator fre-
quency near the initial site of inoculation (the ‘‘homeland’’)
but increasing frequency with increasing distance from the
homeland (Figure 2E). Lattice-based spatial simulations of a
Prisoner’s Dilemma show the same spatiotemporal dynamic
of initial decline in cooperator frequency followed by increase
as expansion proceeds (Figure 2D). Cooperators invade when
rare over a range of imposed costs (Figure 3). Furthermore,
when the benefit of cooperation is removed by competing
strains on glucose medium, the cooperator strain no longer in-
creases in frequency upon spatial expansion (Figure S4).
These data clearly demonstrate that spatial expansion can
promote the evolution of cooperation.
How does spatial expansion promote cooperation? Fluores-
cent colony images reveal the formation of discrete sectors
of fixed genotypes (Figures 2A, 2B, and 3), which is the col-
ony-level signature of genetic demixing [8]. Thus, spatial
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Figure 2. Spatial Expansion Promotes the Evolution of Cooperation in a
Prisoner’s Dilemma
(A) Growth of fluorescently labeled colonies (cooperators in red, defectors in
green).
(B) Competitions inoculated with different initial cooperator frequencies
(from top to bottom: 0.99, 0.90, 0.50, 0.10, and 0.01) after 7 days of growth
(not to scale). Note the visible expansion of cooperator (red) sectors at col-
ony frontiers and proliferation of defectors (green) in colony interior.
(C) Frequency trajectory of the cooperator strain in spatially expanding
(solid lines) and stationary (nonexpanding) (dotted lines) competitions as
measured by FACS over the experiment. Dotted lines follow the same pop-
ulations over thewhole time course; spatial expansions required destructive
sampling of colonies at each time point. Note that frequency is measured
over the whole colony, not just at the frontier.
(D) Frequency dynamics from lattice-based spatial simulations of a
Prisoner’s Dilemma game with nonoverlapping generations in radially ex-
panding (solid lines) and stationary (dotted lines) populations initiated
from well-mixed (relatedness = 0) homelands of varying initial cooperator
frequencies, with simulation parameters W0 = 1, K = 50, m = 0.2, b = 0.5,
c = 0.1 (see Supplemental Experimental Procedures).
(E) Image analysis of experimental colonies after 7 days of growth. Cooper-
ator frequency was measured along the circumference of a circle of radius r
centered at the colony center (importantly, this means that frequency is not
cumulative). Each line denotes the average over three replicates for a
different imposed cost (cycloheximide concentrations from 0 nM [dashed
blue line] to 200 nM [solid red line] in 25 nM increments) with an initial coop-
erator frequency of 0.10.
Imposed cost in (A)–(C) was 50 nM cycloheximide. Error bars represent 95%
confidence intervals.
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921expansion can lead to high positive assortment of coopera-
tors via genetic demixing, even though this assortment is
opposed by selection favoring defectors within demes(Figure 1B; Figure S1). Local fixation of cooperators at fron-
tiers despite counterselection within demes is analogous to
surfing by deleterious mutations [6, 10, 24, 25] and requires
similar conditions to obtain. In other words, spatial expansion
leads to the formation of uniform sectors of cooperators or de-
fectors, increasing genetic relatedness of nearby individuals.
This diminished local genetic diversity reduces the direct
competition between cooperators and defectors (see also
[33]), thereby mitigating the principle selective advantage of
defection.
We note that genetic demixing (i.e., ‘‘sectoring’’) is particu-
larly clear in our experimental yeast system because yeast
lack motility and ‘‘dispersal’’ of offspring is local. In other sys-
tems, movement of individuals and dispersal of offspring can
in principle blur sector boundaries and oppose demixing at
the frontier. In the extreme case where movement and
dispersal are very long range, the spatial sectoring we
describe here will not occur, and neither our analysis nor our
results will generalize to this situation. In real populations,
however, movement and dispersal are usually spatially
restricted: a migrant is more likely to disperse nearby than
far away. In this case, genetic demixing will occur provided
that outward range expansion is sufficiently rapid compared
to the rate of dispersal between occupied demes across
sector boundaries (i.e., perpendicular to the expansion direc-
tion) [24, 25, 34]. In nature, species as diverse as rabies virus
[35] and humans [36] show genetic signatures of expansion-
associated demixing and sectoring, suggesting that the phe-
nomenon we describe here may apply more generally. To the
extent that spatial expansion-associated genetic demixing is
possible in a species, the mechanism we describe here pro-
moting the evolution of cooperation will also be possible.
Once cooperator sectors establish, their overall productivity
will be higher than that of defector sectors provided the fitness
benefit of cooperation exceeds the cost of cooperation, b > c
(Figure S2; Heuristic Description of Model and Derivation of
Analytical Results). When this is true, cooperator sectors will
expand radially faster than neighboring defector sectors, lead-
ing to a corresponding expansion of the boundaries of the
cooperator sectors at the expense of neighboring defector
sectors as we see in our experiments (Figures 2B, 2E and 3).
This leads to an overall increase in cooperator frequency and
suggests that range expansion creates a force of natural selec-
tion favoring the ‘‘survival of the fastest.’’ This force acts to
promote genotypes supporting maximal group productivity,
because high-productivity sectors expand at a faster rate, al-
lowing them to overtake lower-productivity sectors.
We turn to stochastic, lattice-based spatial simulations to
further test the ‘‘survival of the fastest’’ hypothesis. To test
whether ‘‘survival of the fastest’’ is indeed necessary for range
expansion to promote cooperation, we eliminate this force by
restricting expansion to one dimension in our spatial simula-
tions. In one dimension (e.g., a linear stepping-stone model),
an expanding subpopulation has no neighboring subpopula-
tions to compete with, so that intergroup competition is ab-
sent. In this case, we find that the probability of cooperator
establishment at the front is never greater than the neutral
probability of establishment (which is equal to the initial fre-
quency of the allele, p0) and declines with increasing cost (Fig-
ure 4). Put differently, cooperators can only outrun defectors in
a one-dimensional Prisoner’s Dilemma if they randomly take
over the frontier, an outcome uniformly opposed by selection
(Figure S2; Heuristic Description of Model and Derivation of
Analytical Results).
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Figure 3. Invasion of Rare Cooperators during
Colony Expansion over a Range of Imposed
Costs
Colonies imaged after 7 days of growth (not to
scale). Competitions were inoculated with coop-
erators (red) at frequency 0.10 (top row) or 0.01
(bottom row) at different cycloheximide concen-
trations.
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922In contrast to the one-dimensional case, the probability of
cooperators fixing at the frontier is substantially higher in
two dimensions, where subpopulations compete with neigh-
bors for occupancy of uncolonized habitat (Figure 4). Two-
dimensional expansions are also more efficient at purging
deleterious alleles from frontiers, as seen in the comparison
of the black and gray dashed lines in Figure 4. Our data sup-
port the conclusion that two-dimensional spatial expansions
generate selection at the frontier for genotypes that maximize
group productivity, because these genotypes lead to the
greatest expansion velocity of the front, allowing cooperator-
enriched demes to overtake defector-enriched demes. Spatial
expansion generates both conditions necessary for natural
selection: heritability (positive assortment of social strategies,
making one’s social environment heritable) and differential
success (‘‘survival of the fastest’’).
Microbes posses a multiplicity of cooperative phenotypes
[12], and rapid cell division in conjunction with large colony
sizes makes the repeated emergence of defector mutants0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.60.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
A B
Frontier
Homeland Relative Cost (c/b)Co
op
. F
re
q.
 a
t F
ro
nt
ie
r
Figure 4. Selection for Cooperation in Spatially Expanding Populations Re-
quires Competition among Neighboring Frontier Subpopulations
Results of lattice-based spatial simulations of a Prisoner’s Dilemma game in
a population expanding in one direction (i.e., a linear front [8]). (A) shows an
example of the endpoint of a two-dimensional simulation (cooperators in
red, defectors in green); (B) shows averages over 100–500 iterations for
two-dimensional (black) and one-dimensional (gray) simulations. Each lat-
tice site is a subpopulation growing logistically to size K = 50 in a metapo-
pulation of dimension 1 3 150 (one-dimensional) or 25 3 150 (two-dimen-
sional) sites. The vertical axis in (B) gives the frequency of cooperators at
the population frontier (defined here as a 1 3 10 or 25 3 10 area at the
furthest edge of the population) after 200 generations. The horizontal dotted
line indicates the neutral expectation of this value. Simulations were initi-
ated with cooperators at 0.10 frequency in a well-mixed (relatedness = 0)
homeland of length 10 sites. Two-dimensional expansions (black) select
for cooperation; one-dimensional expansions (gray) cannot. b = 0.5 for solid
lines; dashed lines denote zero social effect (b = 0); note that the horizontal
axis has been normalized by b = 0.5. Simulation parameters areW0 = 1, K =
50, m = 0.2. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals.inevitable in nature. We have demon-
strated that colony growth itself creates
a force that promotes cooperation and
inhibits colony invasion by defector mu-
tants. Range expansions may promotecooperation more generally and may allow already coopera-
tive species to shed social parasites, so long as the pattern
and rate of dispersal and reproduction allow for genetic dem-
ixing upon expansion. It is possible that reduced cheater load
upon expansionmay accelerate biological invasion by cooper-
ative species, with potential implications for biological control.
Stochastic demixing may also occur with culturally trans-
mitted phenotypes, such that range expansion may have
been important in the spread of cultural norms facilitating
cooperation in humans. Yet this force persists only as long
as expansion continues. Repeated cycles of expansion and
contraction, possibly due to frequent disturbance, may be
necessary to maintain persistent selection for cooperation by
this mechanism.
Supplemental Information
Supplemental Information includes a heuristic description of the model and
derivation of analytical results, four figures, and Supplemental Experimental
Procedures and can be found with this article online at http://dx.doi.org/10.
1016/j.cub.2013.04.026.
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